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I 
Since 1977, when the initial decision was made to 
plan the deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles 
in European territory, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) has found itself mired in arguably the longest 
period of controversy over defensive weapons strategy in its 
thirty-seven year history. How has it come to pass that the 
Atlantic Alliance finds itself in this situation and what 
are the implications for European-American relations? 
For almost four decades the Atlantic Alliance has 
served as the primary framework for maintaining peaceful 
relationships between its members and those states which 
constitute the Warsaw Pact. In that capacity, notwithstand-
ing varied crises and periods of significant stress, NATO 
has compiled a track record of enormous achievement. No 
other collective security organization in modern times has 
endured for so long in the face of so many obstacles. Never-
theless, NATO cannot rest on its laurels. The continued 
growth of Soviet military power and the expansionist nature 
of that country's foreign policy require that the Alliance 
continues to act as a viable means of deterrence. In this 
context, a gradual withering of cohesiveness within NATO, or 
worse, a fracture of its basic foundations could be poteB-
tially ruinous. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the current troubles 
which confront the Alliance be resolved in a manner that is 
both expeditious as well as comprehensive. Not only would 
such remedies enhance NATO as a deterrent force, but they 
would act to heighten the Alliance's political and economic 
position as well. 
This discussion will focus primarily on NATO's cur-
rent defense strategy of "flexible response", the decision 
on and eventual deployment of Pershing II and cruise mis-
siles, and the proposed "Strategic Defense Initiative." 
After a review of related literature on these topics, the 
discussion will turn to their effect on European-American 
relations and potential remedial measures. 
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II 
That NATO is now enduring a period of hardship is 
largely undisputed. The extent to which the Alliance's cur-
rent troubles have progressed, however, is a matter which 
has been subject to substantial debate. Lawrence Eagleburg-
er, in an address prepared for the National Newspaper Asso-
ciation, suggested that although there are challenges to be 
met by NATO, "It is not my thesis that the North Atlantic 
alliance is now in crisis."l Nevertheless, there are a sig-
nificant number of observers who have stated, for example, 
that, "Forces beyond the contol of any statesman, no matter 
how skilled or dedicated, have jeopardized the very survival 
of the Alliance. ,,2 
NATO has experienced difficulties many times in the 
past thirty-seven years. The Suez and Berlin crises of the 
1950's, France's withdrawal from the military arm of the 
Alliance, and the pressure exerted on its members during the 
Vietnam era have all confronted NATO in one form or another 
with varying degrees of turmoil. However, the current dis-
enchantment within the Alliance distinguishes itself from 
other periods of trouble in both degree and composition. 
1Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "The Transatlantic 
Relationship: A Long-Term Perspective," Department of State 
Bulletin, 84: 39-42, April, 1984. 
2Eliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," 
Foreign Affairs, 61,2 (Winter 1982-1983): 325-343. 
Writing in The Wilson Quarterly, Kolodziej and 
Pollard state, 
Americans and their NATO partners have repeatedly 
argued over four key issues: military strategy and 
nuclear weapons, relations with the Soviets, dis-
tribution of defense burdens, and trade and mone-
tary matters. But at no time have these four pro~­
lems afflicted the allies all at once--until now. 
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While somewhat simplistic in its analysis, Kolodziej and Pol-
lard's suggestion illuminates the depth of the disputes 
within the Alliance. These are problems, however, that can 
be solved, 
•••• by inelegant but workable compromises; the petty 
resentments of the moment will be understood as 
such:· fits of pique which lead tn the spats commEn 
to any couple, no matter how secure the marriage. 
Although important in their own right, the policy 
disputes within NATO that have occurred over the last sever-
al years take on added significance when they are viewed in 
a larger context. Freedman suggests that, 
•••• it remains unclear whether this conjunction of 
arguments is a temporary phenomenon brought about 
by the strains of recession or by the incompatibil-
ity of the current crop of political leaders, or 
whether we are witnessing the symptoms of a much 
deeper crisis that is unsettling the whole;:.;set:,of 
assumptions that have governed Western policy-
making over the past three decades. 5 
3Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert A. Pollard, liThe 
Uneasy Alliance: Western Europe and the United States," 
The Wison Quarterly, 7, 5(Winter 1983): 112-120. 
4Cohen, QE. cit., p. 325. 
5Lawrence Freedman, "The Atlantic Crisis, II International 
Affairs, 58, 2(Summer 1982): 395-412. 
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The malaise which NATO now suffers from, and which 
according to Freedman is possibly representative of struc-
tural problems within the Alliance, originated in large part 
with the decision by the United states to attempt to base 
intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe in response to 
the deployment of medium range SS-20s by the Soviet Union. 
From almost the moment the decision was made, controversy 
erupted and to this day is still visible if only in a dilut-
ed form. 
The December 1979 decision to deploy the missiles 
took what was called a "dual.;...track" form. This involved ne-
gotiating the limitations of nuclear weapons in Europe while 
simultaneously preparing to base American Pershing II and 
cruise missiles on European soil. The logic involved with 
this decision was that unless NATO had something to trade 
with the Soviets during arms control negotiations it would 
be doubtful that Moscow might sacrifice any existing sys-
tems. This approach to arms control would eventually fal-
ter, however, because, 
•••• the Eurostrategic weapons began to take on a 
life of their own as American officials, who have 
lately been excessively running down US defence 
capabilities, insisted that NATO required these 6 
missiles to plug a gap in the deterrent spectrum. 
What this did was to foment much opposition from the Euro-
peans who understandably accused the United States of 
6stanley Kober, "Can NATO Survive?" International 
Affairs, 59, 3(Summer 1983) p. 341. 
abandoning the negotiating track of the original decision. 
As Bertram points out, putting nuclear weapons programs in 
an arms control context makes them more palatable to public 
opinion which suggests why, 
•••• one of the costly political mistakes of the 
early Reagan Administration was precisely to ex-
press misgivings about the arms control process and 
to contend that only a strengthened West could in-
duce the Soviet Union to accommodate Western secur-
ity interests. Deterrence by nuclear weapons will 
generally only be tolerated by public opinion if it 
is accompanied by the search for common constraints 
with the Soviet side.? 
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The other aspect of the Pershing II and cruise mis-
sile deployment that acted to cause such controversy was the 
nature of the weapons themselves. These systems, stationed 
on European territory, were intended to counter the threat 
to that same European soil by the Soviet's SS-20s which by 
design were apparently for use against European targets. 
This led to the perception that America's European allies 
were being "decoupled" from the United State's security 
blanket and that the next war could possibly be fought en-
tirely on their soil. These perceptions were only intensi-
fied in 1981 when President Reagan, responding to a question 
as to the possibility of a limited exchange of nuclear weap-
ons between the United States and the Soviet Union, stated, 
I don't honestly know ••• I could see where you could 
have the exchange of tactical weapons against 
troops in the field without it bringing eigher one 
of the major powers to pushing the button. 
? Christoph Bertram, "Europe and America in 1983," 
Foreign Affairs, 62, 3(Summer 1983) p. 619. 
8The New York Times, 21 October 1981, p. A5. 
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Kober suggests, however, that, 
The risk of decoupling was probably exaggerated. 
Deterrence is the result not of the certainty of 
nuclear retaliation, but of the uncertainty that 
there will not be retaliation in the event of ag-
gression. Given the destructiveness of the super-
powers' huge arsenals, that uncertainty does not 
have to be very high to be effective. Thus, if 
extended deterrence appears riskier for the United 
states in conditions of nuclear parity than it did 
before it is still doubtful that the Soviet lead-
ership feels it could unleash an attack against 
Western Europe confident that the United states 
would refrain from escalating to central nuclear 
exchanges, especially in view of the continued 
presence of hundreds of thousands of American 
troops in Europe.~ 
Although much consternation has been directed by the 
Europeans towards America in general and the Reagan Admini-
stration in particular with regard to arms control and the 
perceived risk of decoupling, these concerns stem, in large 
part, from the nuclear strategy which has been adopted by 
NATO. 
The excessive reliance on the threat to use nuclear 
weapons first in a conflict forces NATO governments 
to pretend to be more irrational than they actually 
are, and definitely more than they wish to appear 
to their public. NATO is caught between the need 
to warn the Soviet Union that it might escalate a 
conflIct, despite the suicidal implications of such 
a move, and to 15assuNthe public that it would not 
be so reckless. 
The policy that dictates that NATO members might con-
sider the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a Soviet 
attack was formulated when America's nuclear advantage was 
9Kober, QE. cit., p.342 
10 Lawrence Freedman,"NATO: Tell-and Trust-the People," 
The Times of London, 25 January 1984, p.12. 
completely overwhelming. This, however, is no longer the 
case. The nuclear advantage that once was the United 
states' has now been transfered to the Soviet Union by a 
8 
slight margin. 
The general problem with NATO's present defense 
strategy is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
entertain the idea that retaliation in response to a Soviet 
attack on Europe could be implemented without a substantial 
risk of escalation to nuclear weapons, Currently, there are 
two major schools of thought which have postulated potential 
solutions to this problem. The first has been posited by 
the "Big Four": McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. 
McNamara, and Gerard Smith. They have argued that a policy 
of "no first-use" of nuclear weapons coupled with a deter-
mined build-up of European conventional forces would stabi-
lize the Alliance politically while simultaneously raising 
the nuclear threshold. They state that, 
It is time to recognize that no one has ever 
succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to 
believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on 
the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to 
remain limited. Every serious analysis and every 
military exercise, for over 25 years, has demon-
strated that even the most restrained battlefield 
use would be enormously destuctive to civilian 
life and property. There is no way for anyone to 
have any confidence that such a nuclear action 
will not lead to further and more devastating ex-
changes. Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by 
the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high 
and inescapable risk of escalation into the gener-
al nuclear war Wptch would bring ruin to all and 
victory to none. 
llBundy , Kennan, McNamara, and Smith, "Nuclear Weapons 
and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs, 60,4(Spring '82) 
p.757. 
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The second potential solution to the problem of 
NATO's "flexible response" is not a new strategy at all but 
merely an augmentation of the current doctrine. The strate-
gy of "flexible response" allows for three types of retalia-
tion to a Soviet attack: 1) direct defense, 2) deliberate 
escalation. 3) general nuclear response. In the first in-
stance, NATO's conventional forces would defeat a Warsaw 
Pact invasion or stifle it to the point where responsibility 
for escalation would be shifted to the Soviets. Deliberate 
escalation envisions that NATO. faced with overwhelming 
odds, would escalate the conflict through the use of tacti-
calor theatre nuclear weapons. The third method of retali-
ation, general nuclear response, would theoretically occur 
if Warsaw Pact forces had made expansive breakthroughs of 
NATO lines or if the conflict had already risen to the point 
of deliberate escalation. The doctrine was formulated to be 
purposely vague so as to force the Soviets to guess which 
type of retaliation would occur in response to an attack. 
The primary drawback of "flexible response" is that 
the primary factor constituting its deterrent is the threat 
of escalation. Although it has already been discussed how 
this threat of escalation was intended to be inherent in the 
doctrine, the problem arises in that the current status of 
NATO's conventional forces render escalation almost a given 
rather than a threat. By most accounts, it would be only a 
matter of days before the Warsaw Pact forces had inflicted 
enough damage on the Alliance's defenses that escalation 
would be necessitated unless massive sections of the Euro-
pean landscape were to be sacrificed. Thus, the present 
state of NATO's conventional forces make it not unlikely 
10 
that the first respone of direct defense would be bypassed. 
One of the more vocal advocates of enhancing the 
"C doct'ine of "flexible response" has been the Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe, General Bernard W. Rogers. In response 
to the present lack of viability of "flexible response's" 
first stage, he has proposed that, 
There is a more acceptable alternative to 
this posture, namely to acquire a conventional 
capability that would provide a good prospect of 
success in the forward defense of Europe ••• We do 
need some increase in numbers of forces to offset 
Soviet military growth, but far more important to 
success is the enhancement of our ability to do 
better with our forces in being and to carry out 
the essential modernization of those forces .•• we 
need the capability to hold the lead divisions of 
a major Warsaw Pact conventional attack while we 
conduct an effective interdiction and destruction 
campaign with conventional means against its 
follow-on forces ••• At the same time, we must have 
greater assurance in our ability to control the 
sea lanes to Europe and to win the air war over 
the continent. 12 
Knowing the limitations of "flexible response" with-
out a supplemented conventional deterrent, Rogers has, how-
ever, shunned the adoption of the policy of "no first-use." 
He has suggested that, 
To say that NATO should strive to attain a 
conventional posture which would constitute a 
credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact conventional 
aggression is not to imply that the Alliance 
12General Bernard W. Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: 
Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," Foreign Affairs, 60,5 
(Summer 1982) p.1152-115J. 
should also now declare a "no-first-use" policy 
for its nuclear weapons ••• The single most import-
ant factor in restraining Soviet aggression will 
always be that chasm of uncertainty about Western 
readiness to cross the nuclear threshold ••• even if 
we were to develop a conventional defense during 
this decade along the lines described, we could 
never be certain of success without eventual re-
course to nuclear weapons ••• Another inherent dan-
ger of declared no-first-use is that many in Eur-
ope and the United States would see such a policy 
as a limitation on the American commitment to Eur-
opean security. This might well create a situa-
tion in which the final guarantor of deterrence 
-the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal- would be 
viewed as divorced from the fate of Europe ••• 
NATO's ability to deter would be jeopardized as 
much, or more, by eliminating the flexibility to 
escalate than it would by continuing the current 
inflexible posture of having to escalate in order 
to defend successfully.13 
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The fear of decoupling, that Rogers suggests would 
result from a policy of "no first-use" of nuclear weapons, 
has been further exacerbated by President Reagan's Strategic 
Defense Initiative~(SDI). First presented by Reagan in the 
of Spring of 1983, SDI envisions an array'satellite based la-
sers and detection devices augmented by land based radars 
and high speed missiles. These systems would act in the 
event of a Soviet missile attack as a defensive screen 
through which, theoretically, none of the enemy's missiles 
could penetrate. The satellite baaed lasers would destroy 
Soviet missiles after they cleared their silos and as they 
began to release their individually targeted warheads at the 
top of their ballistic arc. Any warheads that had avoided 
the space based lasers would then be tracked and fired upon 
by high speed non-nuclear missiles. 
13 Rogers, £2. cit., p.1153-1154. 
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The theoretical ~ses of SDI, as the previous de-
scription suggests, have largely been applied to those nu-
clear systems in which a high trajectory and relatively long 
flight time (approximately thirty minutes) allow for the 
tracking and targeting of their warheads before they have 
reached their targets. In other words, snI in its primary 
formulation would apparently be intended for use solely 
against the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviets. It is 
possible then that, 
A 'decoupling' of Europe from the US, with in-
ferior security for Europe could arise from any de-
ployed strategic defense against high-trajectory 
missiles like intercontinental and SS-20 ballistic 
missiles. This area of SDI research is the most 
promising-but its success would leave ground-hug-
ging cruise and low-flying ballistic missiles un-
challenged. Since the Soviet Union would presum-
ably imitate within five years or so whatever stra-
tegic defense the US developed, such an arrangement 
could effectively neutralize the superpowers' ar-
senals and leave Europe singularly vulnerable to 14 
those cruises and short-range ballistic missiles. 
The Europeans, as well as many others in the United 
States, have expressed concerns that aside from possibly 
decoupling Europe from the United States, SDI would alter 
the basic status quo of deterrence. 
Does not a plan that envisages a world where 
nuclear missiles are unable to reach their targets 
undermine the whole basis of deterrence and in-
crease the chances of a conventional war in Eur-
ope?15 
14Elizabeth Pond, "Future of the Atlantic Alliance: 
Unity ••• in Diversity?" The Christian Science Monitor, 12 
March 1985, p.10-l1. -
15Jon Connell,"How 'Star Wars' Could Scuttle Polaris," 
The Sunday Times of London, 26 February 1984, p.21C. 
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SDr has also been faulted for its dependence on la-
ser and detection devices based on satellites. While ini-
tially the United states space based defense systems would 
be impervious to Soviet attack. once Russian antisatellite 
(ASAT) technology advanced far enough • 
••• the US will be the far greater loser, since it 
is far more dependent on satellites for essential 
military communication. positioning. surveillance. 
and targeting. 
Therefore •••• it would be to the West's advan-
tage to negotiate a ban on antisatellite weapons 
now before both sides develop such capability.1b 
However. 
Washington officials believe that since much 
of the technology being developed for Asats is 
similar to that being studied for anti-missile 
systems, a ban on the former would severely re-
strict research into the latter. Secondly. Asats 
are small, and can be easily hidden, so the prob-
lems of verifying an Asat ban would be formi-
dable. 7 
16Elizabeth Pond, "Europe Fears 'Star Wars' May Destroy, 
Not Defend West," The Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 
1984, p.38. -
17Connell, Q£. cit., p.21C. 
III 
The initial decision to deploy Pershing II and 
cp-uise missiles in Europe was in response to a perceived 
need to counter what was considered to be a significant dis-
parity between the theatre nuclear forces of the Soviet 
Union targeted at Europe and those, or lack thereof, target-
ed at the Soviet Union by the Alliance. The coupling of the 
deployment of these systems to the intention that there be 
arms control negotiations to reduce such weapons on both 
sides was originally intended to make their deployment more 
palatable to the public, specifically the Europeans. 
Once, however, the plans for deployment had proceeded, 
as previously pointed out, they began to take on a life of 
their own as American officials concentrated their arguments 
on a perceived "window of vulnerability" while ignoring, to 
a significant extent, the second track of negotiating their 
reduction. 
In reality, it was the West Germans who had initiated 
the drive for the deployment of the missiles. The Germans, 
however, did not wish this posture to be thrashed about in 
public in view of the strong anti-nuclear sentiments in 
their country. The United States, nevertheless, wishing to 
show that they were not the only hawks in the Alliance pres-
sured the Germans to go public. The Soviets on the other 
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hand were pressuring the Germans with threats of ending de-
tente and starting a new arms race. The Germans, in trae 
Hamlet form, would eventually make no decision save for an-
nouncing that deployment should be linked to arms negetia-
tions and stating that they would deploy only if another 
continental European nation would accept the missiles there-
by transferring much of the pressure away from them,18 
The deployment proceedings after that point bogged 
down in the political controversy in Belgium, Holland, and 
Italy whose publics were less than enthused about their gov-
ernments receiving new nuclear weapons. Once Germany had 
shifted the decision to deploy away from themselves, it was 
the United states who began to take the brunt of the criti-
cism being the other party most eager to begin deployment. 
Bertram points out that, 
While it is possible that future West European 
governments will ask for a more defined respons-
i~ility in America's nuclear decisions, it is not 
very likely; more probably, they will want to re-
turn to the convenient position of supporting u.s. 
nuclear decisions without being accountable for 
them ••• While it may not be sufficient as a durable 
formula for Alliance nuclear diplomacy in the fu-
ture, i 1t is at least politically acceptable in Europe. 9 
The NATO defense rtoctrine of "flexible response" il-
luminates one of the Alliance's more serious dilemmas. It 
is largely agreed upon that for "flexible response" to be a 
18Pierre Lellouche,"Europe and Her Defense," Foreign 
Affairs, 59,4(Spring 1981) p.822. 
19ChristoPh Bertram, "The Implications of Theatre 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Foreign Affairs, 60,2(Winter 
1981-1982) p.)l). 
more viable defense doctrine, NATO's conventional defense 
forces must be enhanced significantly. Why then doesn't 
the Alliance make a concerted effort to supplement them? 
Senator Sam Nunn suggests that, 
•.•. First, the conventional force gap beween NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact has been described as so large 
for so long that a viable conventional defense is 
believed by many to be hopeless. Second, the cost 
of matching Warsaw Pact forces one for one-in tanks 
troops, artillery, and aircraft-is seen as prohib-
itive, ~articularly under current economic condi-
tions. 2D 
The Europeans are not likely, even with pressure 
from the United States, to increase their defense commit-
ments to NATO by a sUbstantial margin. Proposals made by 
16 
General Bernard Rogers to achieve this enhancement would re-
quire a commitment to defense of 4% of annual real growth 
through 1988 over the current 3% by all NATO members. 21 
It has been suggested that the United States could 
attempt to force the Europeans to make spending increases 
by threatening to withdraw U.S. troops or by adopting a "no 
first-use" policy. To resort to either of these extremes 
would leave the Europeans open to Soviet conventional aggres-
sion which could in turn put the United States in a position 
in which they would be forced to use nuclear weapons or sac-
rifice their NATO allies. 
20Senator Sam Nunn, Report to the Committee on Armed 
Services, United States Senate,"NATO= Can the Alliance Be 
Saved?" Atlantic Community Quarterly, 20,2(Summer 1982)p.128. 
21 Nunn, Q2. cit., p.132. 
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It is becoming increasingly apparent, as the United 
States' global interests become greater and the current 
shift in interest towards the Pacific Basin continues, that 
Europe must begin to assume more responsibility for its own 
defense. The Europeans are going, 
••• to have to face an increasingly unfavorable sit-
uation given 1) the growing Soviet capacity to 
launch a surprise attack, and 2) the tendency on 
the part of the United States to move forces and 
equipment out of Europe for contingencies arising 
in Third World regions(in particular, the Persian 
Gulf area). Improving the conventional military 
balance between East and West will imply, at the 
outset, that a number of financial~ and therefore 
political choices have to be made.~2 
Nevertheless, 
••• in the absence of political will among key Euro-
pean nations to take their security into their own 
hands, it is hard to see how an autonomous European 
security entity could be established, even in the 
very long term. 23 
The Strategic Defense Initiative, of all the current 
topics associated with NATO, is probably the most controver-
sial. The risk of Europe being decoupled from the United 
States' nuclear guarantee, the huge costs associated with 
the project, and the lingering doubts concerning the pro-
gram's ability to achieve its intended use all function to 
make SDI the most potentially divisive issue in NATO his-
tory. 
The Reagan Administration has done little to calm 
22 Lellouche, £E. cit., p.8]O. 
2JIbid., p.828. 
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Europe's fears of decoupling aside from making bland pro-
nouncements as to how the finished product will protect Eur-
ope as well as the United States. European concerns are un-
derstandable when the program is termed the Strategic De-
fense Initiative and the words "tactical" or "theatre" are 
totally excluded. 
The most disturbing thought concerning SDI is that 
while billions of dollars are slotted to be spent on its de-
velopment, 
••• no one with whom I have talked honestly believes 
that we can ever achieve the President's fanciful 
objective of-to use his language-rendering the 
Soviet missile force -impotent and obsolete.' A 
few months ago during a private conversation with 
the administration official who, probably more than 
any other, provides the intellecmual impetus for 
the star wars project, I asserted that the Presi-
dent's objective was pure fantasy. He replied: 'Of 
course we all know that. We're embarrassed by it, 
and we wish he'd start playing a different record. 
Obviously, we can't hope to build a system that 
will safeguard American cities or protect the Amer-
ican population, but we should be able to shield at 
least some of our own nuclear arsenal. We should 
be able to stop a sUbstantial percentage of the 
Soviet's nuclear weapons from reaching their tar-
gets. 
To that I replied, 'Well, if that's all you 
hope to accomplish, then the proposal as represent-
ed is fraudulent; it is in realistic terms nothing 
more than a stimulus to escalation; Moscow will 
have to augment its nuclear arsenal by a factor of 
'X' to enable it to launch enough weapons to ensure 
that the critical minimum gets through. Then we'll 
have to match that escalation.' 
At that poi~E he terminated the conversation, 
turned and left. 
24George W. Ball,"Reagan's Ramboism-the Fantasy of Star 
Wars and the Danger of Real Wars," The Christian Science 
Monitor, 28 April 1986, p.18. 
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If a high administration official admits that a sub-
stantial portion of the rhetoric that the President has been 
delivering to his European counterparts is duplicitous and 
largely false, it can only be assumed that the great sums of 
money the European governments are spending on SnI research 
will, in the end, only work to promote that decoupling to 
which they have expressed so many fears and only place more 
of a strain on the Alliance than that which exists already. 
IV 
The purpose of this study was to research the reasons 
for the current problems associated with NATO's defensive 
doctrine and to see what implications there would be for 
European-American relations. 
The discussion revealed that the Alliance's troubles 
had arisen in their most earnest form after the initial pro-
cedures to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles. The rea-
son for this disenchantment was linked to the European's per-
ceptions that these deployments would decouple them from 
America's strategic nuclear arsenals and that arms control 
negotiations which were to coincide with the deployment were 
being largely ignored. 
The study also showed that NATO's doctrine of flex-
ible response lacked credibility without a solid convention-
al arm. Without this conventional deterrent, flexible re-
sponse became inflexible and instead of threatening escala-
tion it almost assumed it. 
Thirdly, the discussion pointed out some of the prob-
lems associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative. The 
primary drawbacks with this program are: 1) its threat to 
decouple Europe from the United States, 2) its huge costs, 
3) its lack of viability as a useful strategic deterrent. 
The Atlantic Alliance can overcome the problems as-
sociated with its defense strategies but its policy-making 
21 
must first become more coherent. The disarray that coincided 
with the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles 
must be avoided in the future. The continued implementation 
of divisive policies like this one will only work to drive 
the wedge deeper between Alliance members. 
NATO's conventional forces must be enhanced or flex-
ible response will always lack the viability of a strong de-
terrent strategy. As the interests of the United States 
turn elsewhere, it is imperative that Europe begins to sup-
plement here own conventional defenses. The lack of either 
of these two prescriptions will render NATO's long-term fut-
ure problematic in that there would have to be a continuing 
overemphasis on the United states nuclear guarantee. 
Finally, the Strategic Defense Initiative should be 
placed under the closest scrutiny. A program that is pur-
ported to protect European interests but in reality does 
not should be viewed with the utmost suspicion. Whatever 
research benefits that could be derived from the program 
should be weighed carefully against the potentially enormous 
costs, politically,economically, and foremost, militarily. 
22 
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